Abstract-We develop a noise-masking method to increase security in a multiple-input, multiple-output communication system by using known channel state information to calculate a specific masking signal for each block of a space-time blockcoded signal. This masking signal is invisible to the intended receiver since it is designed to be canceled by the equalization process. Using mathematical analysis and numerical simulation of the communication system, we found that it is possible to design an effective security system by employing this method.
I. INTRODUCTION
Herein we introduce a new alternative, or additional, layer of security beyond encryption for multiple-input, multipleoutput (MIMO) wireless communication in a faded channel. We leverage a known set of channel states to increase security by quantitatively understanding the communication link between multiple antennas, then using that information to devise an additive masking signal that will intentionally degrade the message quality to any receiver other than the intended receiver. Conceptually, we are locking the signal with a key derived from the transmitter-to-intended receiver channel state information, but this channel itself serves as the unlocking key. Since the transmitter-to-eavesdropper channel is generally different that the transmitter-to-intended receiver channel, the signal is protected from eavesdropping.
In [1] , Tollefson et al describe a method for using a masking signal to drastically increase the security of a line-of-sight communication system with no fading. Herein, we extend the ideas in [1] to non-line-of-sight MIMO communication systems operating in faded channels, thereby extending the applicability of this type of physical security to a wide range of terrestrial communications systems. In possible military applications, this method could transfer some responsibility of communication security to physical security as the signal would only able to be correctly deciphered within a tiny physical radius of the intended receiver. Our method has the desirable property that no modification is required at the intended receiver, i.e., the intended receiver design does not depend upon the presence of the mask.
In this paper, we implement the common example of the Rayleigh channel model for all simulations and hope that future work will show satisfactory performance for other common channel conditions. Though channel estimation is important in any communication system, it will be absolutely vital to implementation of this masking method because those estimates will be used directly in the calculation of the mask. We will implement training symbols at prescribed intervals to accomplish this task. As with most communication systems, these training symbols will allow the receiver to estimate the channel states for equalization of the received signals. In this method, these channel states will also be used by the transmitter to calculate the masking component. In this work we assume the transmitter and receiver have perfect knowledge of the the channel state information.
II. NOISE MASKING
Every wireless communication system relies on the concept of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR); for a message to be received clearly, the SNR at the receiver must exceed some prescribed minimum value that corresponds to minimum acceptable performance. Therefore, one way to degrade an eavesdropper's ability to effectively receive communication is to add noise to the environment. Unfortunately, adding noise to the environment tends to degrade the ability of all receivers, both intended and otherwise. When multiple antennas are involved, this need not be true because the transmitter emits more than one signal into the environment at the same time, allowing us to design additive noise signals that will cancel out at the intended receiver. Noise masking is related to beamforming, but the goal is to spread the masking signal power over a wide range of possible receiver locations, except in the direction of the intended receiver. Significant investigation done on this topic in [2] showing that secrecy capacity defined in [3] can be significantly improved, and [1] shows a comparison of the effectiveness and economy of different masking signals; these sources lay the groundwork for many of our masking calculations.
The goal in [1] , as herein, was to eliminate the ability of an eavesdropper to receive a decodable signal in the transmitting antenna's sidelobes by using a tailored masking signal. They proved that as the mask to signal ratio (MSR) was increased, the communication system could effectively eliminate signal reception in the sidelobes for a line-of-sight channel with no fading. Their masking signal overwhelmed the communication signal in the sidelobes but did not affect the signal in the intended direction of communication. In this paper, we explore a similar outcome, but in a non-line-of-sight multipath faded channel. In non-line-of-sight communications, this concept becomes more complicated since the channel is time-varying, space-varying, and stochastic. Therefore, the mask calculation must be done in real time with frequent recalculations.
To demonstrate the potential for this type of physical security, we assume a 2x2 MIMO communications system that employs Alamouti encoding and uses maximal ratio combining in the receiver. The channel is assumed to be flat Rayleigh faded and further corrupted by AWGN. Of course, in the frequency selective channel case, multicarrier modulation such as OFDM could be used with sufficiently narrow subchannels as to make the channel flat faded for each subchannel. Although not shown herein, the authors believe the concepts shown in this paper could be applied for any MIMO communications system.
A. The mask, M
This scheme involves developing a masking signal that does not affect communication with an intended receiver but degrades an eavesdropper's ability to decipher the signal. To accomplish this, we design a masking signal that adds zero to the decision metrics at the intended receiver, and a nonzero additive value to the decision metrics at an eavesdropper's receiver.
The masking signal,
will be added to each Alamouti STBC transmission block. These values will need to be recalculated sufficiently rapidly to remain consistent with channel state. This masking vector will be calculated to pair with a corresponding set of channel states that identify the intended receiver.
B. The channel state information, H
The channel state matrix
is the set of channel states where h r,t describes the channel between transmit antenna t and receive antenna r at a certain time. Consistent with flat Rayleigh fading, these channel states are modeled as independent zero-mean unit-variance complex Gaussian random variables. H is the fingerprint of the communication channel; our method uses this fingerprint to tailor the additive masking signal, M, that will make the signal decipherable only at the intended receiver. The channel state information (CSI) must be measured by the receiver and communicated back to the transmitter. This is an important additional task that our masking method requires. To accomplish this, the transmitter will send known training symbols with all components of the masking vector set to zero at a known interval. The receiver can then calculate the CSI and communicate it back to the transmitter. From this point forward it is assumed that the transmitter has perfect knowledge of the CSI. Due to noise and latency, the transmitter will in practice have to make due with imperfect CSI. This paper does not address the issue of imperfect CSI, but the authors acknowledge that issue and intend to determine its significance in future work.
C. The intended receiver
The intended receiver refers to a receive antenna pair at the location and time that produces the channel state H which the transmitter uses to derive the masking signal M. This receiver uses the training symbols to calculate the channel state matrix H. This scheme uses this information as a seed to an algorithm that calculates an additive mask to allow minimum error rate at a receiver with this channel state matrix and much larger error rate at a receiver with a different channel state matrix. To do this we will leverage the decision metric calculations employed by the receive antennas.
D. Eavesdropper
An eavesdropper is any receiver whose position results in a channel state significantly different from that of the intended receiver. [4] shows that the channel coherence distance for a Rayleigh faded channel is less than a wavelength, so generally any receiver not collocated with the intended receiver will have channel state information that is statistically independent of that of the intended receiver. Clearly this fact is important to the envisioned system's security.
III. MASK DESIGN
A. Constraints on M Consistent with the Alamouti code, our proposed transmitter will transmit the block
every two symbol intervals where g tn is sent from transmit antenna t during timeslot n. This block includes the message symbols (s 1 and s 2 ) and the mask symbols (m 11 , m 12 , m 21 , and m 22 ). At the intended receiver, the corresponding received block is Q = q 11 q 12 q 21 q 22 = HG + N.
where q rn is the reception on receive antenna r during timeslot n and N is the 2 by 2 noise matrix. Using maximal ratio combining (MRC), as in [5] and [6], the decision statistic corresponding to s 1 is, ignoring noise terms, If the transmitter chooses the mask M such that
and
then (5) and (7) yield the usual decision statistics and the message can be decoded with optimal BER performance. Therefore, it is our goal to calculate a mask M such that (9) and (10) are satisfied. Note that this will allow the intended receiver to decode the message with unmasked ease. Indeed, the intended receiver is identical to an ordinary receiver in a communications system with no masking. On the other hand, an eavesdropper will have its decision statistics corrupted, as shown in (5) and (7) because its channel state information (H eavesdropper ) is generally quite different than H resulting in
and it is assumed the eavesdropper has no way to determine the intended receiver's channel state information, H. The mask, M, can be calculated at the transmitter, assuming the transmitter has perfect knowledge of the channel state information at the intended receiver, i.e., H. The constraints that must be satisfied are (9), (10) , and a constraint on mask power, such as
which guarantees that the mask power, which must be supplied by the transmitter, is enough to mask the signal at an eavesdropper, but small enough to be transmitted by our transmitter.
B. Calculating the mask, M
M consists of four complex numbers, or equivalently eight real numbers. The solution to constraints (9) and (10) constitutes a four dimensional real subspace inside the eight dimensional real space for the eight real parameters in M. This subspace includes the origin, and therefore intersects the unit radius hypersphere defined by (13). Since this intersection has three degrees of freedom, many solutions exist for M.
We propose the following method of solution. First, choose two arbitrary linear equations (that are not redundant with (9) or (10) or each other) that will pass through the unit radius hypersphere, such as where the A k 's and B k 's are complex numbers chosen arbitrarily at the transmitter. We chose at least one of the B k 's to have |B k | < 1, to guarantee that (15) will intersect the unit radius hypersphere. We then solve the set of four complex linear equations [ (9), (10), (14), (15)] with four complex unknowns (m 11 , m 12 , m 21 , and m 22 ) by the usual method, yielding a single solution of four complex numbers we'll call B. This solution is generally not an acceptable mask, M, because it does not necessarily satisfy our power constraint (13). However, we choose our mask to be
which is easily shown to satisfy (9), (10), and (13).
IV. RESULTS
We demonstrate the validity of our approach via simulation. In simulation, bits were randomly generated, QPSK modulated using the Gray code, and multiplexed into two symbol streams. The mask, M, was then calculated using the method detailed in section III-B above. Each transmit block was then calculated using (3). Channel state information for the intended receiver, H, was randomly generated consistent with a flatfaded Rayleigh channel, i.e. each complex h ij was selected independently from a circularly symmetric zero-mean unitvariance complex Gaussian distribution E |h ij | 2 = 1 . The channel state information for the eavesdropper, H eavesdropper was calculated by independent selection from the same distribution. For the intended receiver, each receive block was calculated using (4) . For the eavesdropper, the same formula is used, except using H eavesdropper vice H. Then, for each receiver, the decision statistics were calculated using the first equality in each of (5) and (7), using the appropriate H or H eavesdropper . Then decision statistics x 1 and x 2 were compared to the decision boundaries (phases ±π/4, ±3π/4) to determine the two QPSK symbols, which were then mapped back to bits. The transmitted and received bitstreams were then compared to count errors and determine the probability of bit error, BER. The first simulation used 10 7 bits and a signal power to mask power ratio of SM R = 0 dB. The results are shown in Figure 1 . Notice that the intended receiver performs identically well with and without the mask present, as predicted, while the eavesdropper has very poor BER performance.
The same methodology was employed, but with varying SM R, to quantify the effect of the mask at the eavesdropper. These results are shown in Figure 2 . 
V. CONCLUSIONS
Through an analytic approach and computer simulations, our work shows that with known channel state information a masking signal can be calculated that will physically and severely limit the area in which a multiple-input, multipleoutput (MIMO) encoded, signal can be deciphered, thereby foiling would-be eavesdroppers.
A. Objectives
The objective of this work was to investigate the effect of a complex additive noise signal on a MIMO receiver's decision statistics. In this pursuit we realized that this was possible and that it depended heavily on the equalization method employed. By first breaking down the maximal ratio combining method, we analytically solved for a masking vector that would result in zero effect at the receiver with the known channel state information and a nonzero effect anywhere else. We then designed software to perform this calculation with additional constraints in order to efficiently add an effective masking vector to the transmitted signal. Figures 1 and 2 show that this method is effective and the first objective was met.
B. Limitations and further research opportunities
Though the objectives were met, significant challenges revealed many areas available for additional research.
Alternative methods of obtaining channel state information (CSI) Though training symbols are a well understood and popular method of determination of channel states, the lower throughput given up by this method has led to significant research into channel reciprocity [8] , [9] . These methods involve the transmitter calculating the channel states via feedback and passing the estimates to the receiver, mitigating the throughput lost to training symbols [10] . These methods rely on the electromagnetic principle that waves traveling over the same channel in either direction will encounter the same set of obstacles causing interference and therefore can be used for estimation [9] . These methods could be applied to further improve the throughput of the method described in this thesis by removing the need for the receiver to communicate the channel states back to the transmitter.
The simulations in this work assumed a Rayleigh faded channel. Further research into a masking agent's performance with other faded channel models would give increased insight into the efficacy and flexibility of this method.
This work assumed the transmitter has perfect knowledge of the CSI. In practice, the CSI at the transmitter is imperfect. Noise and interference corrupt the measurement of CSI at the receiver. Furthermore, latency in the delivery of the measured CSI will worsen its utility if the channel evolves rapidly. The authors intend to measure the significance of the errors in CSI, and, if necessary, explore methods to mitigate this problem if it is measured as significant to overall BER for the intended receiver. Also, this work has not address the challenge of passing the CSI from the intended receiver to the transmitter without being intercepted by the eavesdropper. Future work could consider how to pass this information securely or could consider options where the receiver calculates the mask and relays the calculated mask back to the transmitter.
